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INTRODUCTION
"[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed
a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice. . .. "
* J.D. May 2006. Special thanks to Adam Leonard, John Grostic, and Eileen Grostic for their
comments on earlier drafts; to Nomali Perera and Stuart Davis for ideas and inspiration; and to Yaman
Shukairy and Alicia Frostick for their tireless editing work.
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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With this single sweeping statement in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme
Court threw the validity of an entire class of laws and a long line of prece-
dents into doubt.2 In dissent, Justice Scalia asserted that "[t]his effectively
decrees the end of all morals legislation."3 "State laws against bigamy, same-
sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication,
bestiality, and obscenity are ... sustainable only in light of Bowers' valida-
tion of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called
into question by today's decision ....
The responses have taken a number of forms. Some have followed Jus-
tice Scalia's lead, criticizing the Lawrence decision and warning of the
social and legal upheaval to come.5 Others have taken a more skeptical and
pragmatic approach, suggesting that widespread moral disapproval may still
provide a legitimate state interest, despite the Court's apparent declaration to
the contrary.6
By far the most common response, however, has been to abandon the
idea that morality alone provides a sufficient basis for law. Harkening backS 7
to or explicitly invoking John Stuart Mill's harm principle, scholars argue
that courts should "permit morality-inspired government action only when it
is supported by reference to empirical or otherwise demonstrable harms."8
2. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion) ("The
traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety,
and morals, and we have upheld such a basis for legislation."); Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188, 196
(1925) ('The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as
will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not ... burdened with the
condition that the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain
....") (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887)); Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. 163, 168
(1850) ('The suppression of nuisances injurious to public health or morality is among the most impor-
tant duties of government.").
3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1585 (2004) ("[W]e think that the most salient characteristic of Lawrence is the
impossibility of determining what it means, other than that five Justices have decided to forbid laws
proscribing sodomy."); Susan Austin Blazier, Note, The Irrational Use of Rational Basis Review in
Lawrence v. Texas: Implications for Our Society, 26 CAMPBELL L. REV. 21, 38 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 337, 348 (2004)
("Is all moral disapproval now an illegitimate state interest, or will the Court continue to allow moral
disapproval to justify statutes where that moral disapproval is of a certain sort, and if so, what sort? My
guess is that where moral disapproval is of long enough standing and still widely agreed upon by most
Americans, the Court would be unlikely to overturn a law reflecting such disapproval."); cf. Williams v.
Attorney Gen. of Alabama, 378 E3d 1232, 1237 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court has noted
on repeated occasions that laws can be based on moral judgments.... One would expect the Supreme
Court to be manifestly more specific and articulate than it was in Lawrence if now such a traditional
and significant jurisprudential principal has been jettisoned wholesale... ") (citations omitted).
7. This is the idea that, as Mill put it, "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 52 (Edward Alexander ed., Broadview Press 1999) (1859); see also
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 4-6 (1963).
8. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1233, 1240 (2004); see also Keith Burgess-Jackson, Our
Millian Constitution: The Supreme Court's Repudiation of Immorality as a Ground of Criminal
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This response tends to minimize, if not ignore, the extent to which mo-
rality and law are intertwined. 9 At the most basic step, individuals,
legislatures, and courts decide what is and is not a harm based on moral
judgment. 0 Despite the best efforts of some lawmakers, judges, and schol-
ars, "no matter how carefully we might disavow moral judgments in light of
the challenges they present for adjudicators, they are inextricably bound up
in our lawmaking and, as a result, inevitably present in our adjudication as
well.""
This is not a new proposition; many scholars have attempted to describe
what they see as the proper role of moral judgment in adjudication and consti-
tutional interpretation. 12 Conspicuously missing from this discussion,
however, is empirical research about moral and psychological development.'3
Courts and scholars alike have spoken of evolving or developing standards,1
4
but rarely do they invoke the findings of psychologists and social researchers
who make a career studying evolving and developing standards and abilities.
This Note aims to begin filling that void.
Researchers in developmental studies have uncovered a series of demon-
strable developmental stages. There is considerable cross-cultural evidence
for the general stages of moral development, extending from childhood
Punishment, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 407, 415 (2004); Markus Dirk Dubber,
Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 568 (2004).
9. See Ronald C. Den Otter, The Place of Moral Judgment in Constitutional Interpretation,
37 IND. L. REV. 375 (2004); Goldberg, supra note 8, at 1300-04.
10. See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 1303 ("Even determinations that concrete injuries amount
to cognizable harms to others are, ultimately, informed by judgments about what harm means.");
Jami Weinstein & Tobyn DeMarco, Challenging Dissent: The Ontology and Logic of Lawrence v.
Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 423, 457 (2004) ("[Mioral justification is a necessary condition
for having a law, no matter how convoluted or hidden that ultimate moral justification is.").
11. Goldberg, supra note 8, at 1303-04.
12. See, e.g., Den Otter, supra note 9, at 403-16; Dubber, supra note 8, at 546-70; Howard
A. Levine, Hugh R. Jones Lecture at Albany Law School, in 67 ALB. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2003);
Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4,
77-83 (2004).
13. Ken Wilber wrote: "The Constitution of the United States is generally a moral-stage 5
document (postconventional and worldcentric)." KEN WILBER, A THEORY OF EVERYTHING 90
(2000) [hereinafter TOE]. Professor Wilson Huhn cited the work of psychologist Lawrence Kohl-
berg and suggested that certain justices of the Supreme Court have fundamentally different
understandings of morality. Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking Human Poten-
tial in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 65, 91-93 & n.161 (2003). Thorough
research found these to be the only sources connecting psychological development and constitu-
tional interpretation. This Note will expand on these observations.
14. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) ("The [Eighth] Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) ("It is ... tempting ... to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects
only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government
interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. But such a view
would be inconsistent with our law.") (citation omitted); JOHN A. FLITER, PRISONERS' RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY (2001); Post, supra note 12, at 54
("Constitutional law can ... enforce constitutional culture only by intervening in an ongoing proc-
ess of historical development, so that constitutional law is always faced with the choice of
encouraging or retarding these evolutionary changes.").
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through adulthood.'5 Indeed, the broad outlines of most models used in de-.•16
velopmental studies today are strikingly similar. Empirical research with
these models demonstrates that the stages they reflect are universal and in-
variant.17
This is not to say that models used in developmental studies are rigidly
deterministic. In prevailing systems, "[d]evelopment is not a linear ladder
but a fluid and flowing affair, with ... what appear to be an almost infinite
number of modalities. Most of today's sophisticated developmental theories
take all of that into account, and-more important-back it with substantial
,,18research.' Because of this "almost infinite" number of modalities, no stage
is inherently good or bad.' 9
Moreover, even within this more fluid developmental framework, one's
developmental stage is not completely determinative of one's moral choices.
Professor Lawrence Kohlberg, for example, distinguishes between what this
Note calls structure and content-between the capabilities, skills, methods,
and reasoning embodied in the structure of a given stage and the specific
moral decisions one makes within that stage using that structure.20 The
stages are "species-wide, shared human characteristics, but culture plays
15. Ken Wilber, Waves, Streams, States and Self: Further Considerations for an Integral
Theory of Consciousness, 7 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES 145, 146, 147-48 (2000) [hereinafter
Waves, Streams, States and Self].
16. TOE, supra note 13, at 5. In fact, one can align most major developmental models, and
models of moral development in particular, along common developmental patterns. See KEN
WILBER, Integral Psychology, in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF KEN WILBER 422, 471-77, 627 chart
IA, 633-38 charts 4A-5C, 644-45 charts 9A-9B (1999) [hereinafter Integral Psychology] (aligning
major developmental models, including those of Jane Loevinger, Don Beck (Spiral Dynamics),
Susanne Cook-Greuter, Robert Kegan, Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, Jean Gebser, and Wilber
himself); cf JORGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 73-75 (Tho-
mas McCarthy trans., 1979) (describing "points of convergence" among various developmental
models).
17. See TOE, supra note 13, at 6 ("Many of the stage models, in fact, have been carefully
checked in first-, second-, and third-world countries."); see also RONALD INGLEHART, THE SILENT
REVOLUTION 43 (1977) ("The results show a cross-national consistency that is almost breath tak-
ing."); DAVID R. SHAFFER, SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT 330-37 (5th ed. 2005)
(reviewing support for and criticisms of Kohlberg's theory and concluding that it describes "an
invariant and universal sequence of moral growth" and "a universal sequence of changes in moral
reasoning extending from childhood through adulthood"); cf Alastair Heron & Elke Kroeger, Intro-
duction to Developmental Psychology, in 4 HANDBOOK OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY:
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 7-9 (Harry C. Triandis & Alastair Heron eds., 1981) (reviewing
evidence for the universality of various areas of psychological development and concluding that "the
amount of evidence for some degree of universality in human development.., is perhaps surprising
and certainly encouraging").
18. TOE, supra note 13, at 5.
19. See id. at 56 (arguing that each stage is "an absolutely necessary and desirable element
of the overall spiral").
20. Lawrence Kohlberg et al., The Current Formulation of the Theory, in 2 LAWRENCE
KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 212,
250-52 (1984); cf KEN WILBER, Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, in 6 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF KEN
WILBER 68 (1999) [hereinafter Sex, Ecology, Spirituality] (distinguishing between deep structures
and surface structures); DON EDWARD BECK & CHRISTOPHER C. COWAN, SPIRAL DYNAMICS: MAS-
TERING VALUES, LEADERSHIP, AND CHANGE 42 (1996) ("[Stages] determine how people think or
make decisions in contrast to what they believe or value.").
[Vol. 105:151
Evolving Objective Standards
variations on these underlying similarities."'" Thus, individuals at the same
stage of development may sometimes make different moral choices, while
individuals at different moral stages, using different reasoning, might arrive
at the same conclusion.
That said, the universal and invariant aspects of developmental stages
have important effects. The successive stages mark successive decreases in
2
egocentrism. Across systems, stages of moral development step from pre-
conventional to conventional to postconventional, egocentric to sociocentric
to worldcentric z3
Recognizing these similarities and links across developmental systems,
this Note will draw primarily from the Spiral Dynamics developmental
24
model in its analysis of morals legislation along developmental lines. This
Note uses Spiral Dynamics solely for ease of understanding, as its plain lan-
guage and real-world examples make it generally accessible to non-
specialists. Importantly, one could perform a similar analysis using other
2-5
major developmental models.
21. Waves, Streams, States and Self, supra note 15, at 148 (quoting J. BERRY ET AL., CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY (1992)).
22. TOE, supra note 13, at 17.
23. See id. at 18-20; Lawrence Kohlberg, A Current Statement on Some Theoretical Issues,
in LAWRENCE KOHLBERG: CONSENSUS & CONTROVERSY 485, 488 tbl.2 (Sohan Modgil & Celia
Modgil eds., 1985) [hereinafter Kohlberg, Current Statement]; Integral Psychology, supra note 16,
at 477.
As defined by Professor Kohlberg, a person operating from the preconventional level follows
rules only if they are externally imposed and enforced, effectively forcing the person to follow the
rules out of pure self-interest. 2 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 172 (1984). Someone operating from the conventional level
"conform[s] to and uphold[s] the rules and expectations and conventions of society or authority just
because they are society's rules, expectations, or conventions." Id. Someone operating from the
postconventional level "understands and basically accepts society's rules, but acceptance of soci-
ety's rules is based on formulating and accepting the general moral principles that underlie these
rules.... [He or she has] differentiated his or her self from the rules and expectations of others and
defines his or her values in terms of self-chosen principles." Id. at 173.
As detailed by Wilber, an egocentric person's morals are "heavily centered on [his or her] own
impulses, physiological needs, and instinctual discharges." TOE, supra note 13, at 19. At the socio-
centric stage, a person's moral guide is the view and perspective of his or her social group or groups,
be it family, religion, ethnic group, or nation. Id. at 20. At the worldcentric stage, universal care,
justice, and fairness emerge as ideals, and the guiding moral principle becomes "[w]hat is right and
fair, not just for me or my tribe or my nation, but for all peoples... " Id.
24. See BECK & COWAN, supra note 20. Based on "decades of research, real-world applica-
tions, and the latest findings of both organizational theorists and neurobiology," Ronnie Lessem,
Introduction to BECK & COWAN, supra note 20, at 1, the Spiral Dynamics system has been tested in
more than fifty thousand people around the world without any major exceptions to the general
scheme, TOE, supra note 13, at 6.
25. Supra note 16; see also Adam B. Leonard, Integral Communication 75-90 (2004) (un-
published M.A. thesis, University of Florida), available at http://etd.fcla.eduIUF/ UFE0004902/
leonard-a.pdf (detailing the correlations between Spiral Dynamics and the work of Ken Wilber, Jean
Gebser, Gerald Heard, Paul Ray and Sherry Ruth Anderson, and Ronald Inglehart); cf Lawrence
Kohlberg & Donald Elfenbein, Capital Punishment, Moral Development, and the Constitution, in
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, I ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVEL-
OPMENT 243 (1981) (using Professor Kohlberg's developmental model to analyze approaches to
capital punishment).
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The Spiral Dynamics model uses eight general stages; 26 the focus of this
Note will be on stages four and five. The following is a brief outline of
stages four and five, with further details elucidated through the analysis in
this Note.27
Individuals operating primarily from stage four are strongly conven-
tional and conformist, with life's meaning, direction, and purpose
28predetermined by an all-powerful other or order. Unquestioned absolutist
principles of right and wrong govern moral reasoning.29 This stage empha-
sizes law and order, concrete-literal and fundamentalist beliefs, and
ethnocentric or sociocentric values.3° Thus, a person using stage four reason-ing would support a ban on certain behavior if the person's ethnic or social
26. Note that Spiral Dynamics uses colors, rather than numbers, to identify the various
stages. BECK & COWAN, supra note 20, at 31, 41; see also TOE, supra note 13, at 7-8 (detailing
reasons for the choice to use colors to identify stages). For ease in understanding, this Note will
identify the stages by number while retaining the sequence laid out in BECK & COWAN, supra note
20, at 41, 45-47. Thus, the stage numbers correlate to the colors as follows: Stage 1-Beige; Stage
2-Purple; Stage 3-Red; Stage 4-Blue; Stage 5-Orange; Stage 6--Green; Stage 7-Yellow;
Stage 8-Turquoise.
27. The stages in the Spiral Dynamics model, summarized:
Stage 1: Survivalistic. Individuals use instincts and habits just to survive, with priority on food,
water, warmth, sex, and safety.
Stage 2: Magical. Individuals use animistic and superstitious thinking, with a focus on rituals,
kinship, and lineage.
Stage 3: Impulsive. Individuals emerge as selves distinct from the group and are impulsive and
egocentric. Power, glory, and self-enjoyment, without regret or remorse, dominate moral rea-
soning.
Stage 4: Conventional/conformist. Absolutist principles of right and wrong govern moral rea-
soning. Individuals emphasize law and order, concrete-literal and fundamentalist beliefs, and
ethnocentric or sociocentric values.
Stage 5: Rational/scientific. Individuals break away from the herd mentality of stage four and
seek truth, meaning, and morality in individualistic terms. Hypothetico-deductive, experimen-
tal, objective, mechanistic, and operational modes of thinking and demonstrable facts are the
primary tools of moral reasoning.
Stage 6: Sensitive. Relativism, diversity, egalitarianism, and tolerance take precedence in
moral reasoning. Individuals embrace postconventional and worldcentric values.
Stage 7: Integrative. Individuals recognize the strengths, as well as the shortcomings, of the
various stages of development, complementing egalitarianism with natural degrees of excel-
lence where appropriate.
Stage 8: Holistic. Individuals recognize and use the entire spiral, unifying the multiple stages
into one conscious system.
BECK & COWAN, supra note 20, at 45-46; Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 481-84; TOE,
supra note 13, at 21.
28. BECK & COWAN, supra note 20, at 46, 231; Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 481;
TOE, supra note 13, at 21,185.
29. BECK & COWAN, supra note 20, at 46; Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 481.
30. BECK & COWAN, supra note 20, at 46; Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 481-82;
TOE, supra note 13, at 21, 85. This absolutist idea of right and wrong is often what we think of
when someone mentions the word "morals." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defin-
ing "morality" as "[c]onformity with recognized rules of correct conduct"). The researchers cited
here, and many others, suggest that we need not restrict ourselves to so narrow a definition.
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group or long-established rules and laws supported such a ban.3 Researches
refer to this stage with such tags as "conformist,"32 and "traditional."33
With the emergence of stage five, individuals break away from the herd
mentality of stage four and seek truth, meaning, and morality in individual-
istic terms.3 4 Absolutist moral principles, standing alone, are no longer
sufficient for moral judgment. Instead, hypothetico-deductive, experimental,
objective, mechanistic, and operational modes of thinking and demonstrable
facts are the primary tools of moral reasoning. 3 This stage emphasizes
achievement, merit, ability, and rational and scientific inquiry and begins to
recognize postconventional and worldcentric values, expanding beyond tra-
dition and one's own ethnic or social group.16 Thus, a person using stage five
reasoning would support a ban on certain behavior if objective facts and
deductive reasoning supported such a ban and it applied without regard to
ethnic or social classifications.37 Researchers have given this stage names
such as "scientific achievement,' 38 "modern," 39 and "materialist, secular-
rational.''4°
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence regard-
ing morals legislation41 mirrors the findings of empirical research on moral
and psychological development. Specifically, the Supreme Court upholds
morals legislation only if it is justified by stage five reasoning. Part I exam-
ines significant Supreme Court cases related to morals legislation over the
last 50 years and argues that the Supreme Court has consistently upheld mor-
als legislation that is justified by stage five reasoning, while consistently
striking down as unconstitutional morals legislation that is not. Part II argues
31. Cf Kohlberg, Current Statement, supra note 23, at 494-95 (describing Kohlberg's con-
ventional stage four and responses to the "Heinz dilemma").
32. Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 481.
33. See TOE, supra note 13, at 30; PAUL H. RAY & SHERRY RUTH ANDERSON, THE CUL-
TURAL CREATIVES 30-32 (2000); Ronald Inglehart & Wayne E. Baker, Modernization, Cultural
Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values, 65 Am. Soc. REV. 19, 23-25 & tbl. 1, 26 tbl. 2
(2000); Leonard, supra note 25, at 75.
34. Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 482.
35. Id.; BECK & COWAN, supra note 20, at 46, 256.
36. BECK & COWAN, supra note 20, at 46, 256; TOE, supra note 13, at 21, 81, 86.
37. Cf Kohlberg, Current Statement, supra note 23, at 495-96 (describing Kohlberg's post-
conventional stage five and responses to various dilemmas).
38. Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 482.
39. See TOE, supra note 13, at 30; RAY & ANDERSON, supra note 33, at 25-30; Leonard,
supra note 25, at 79.
40. See INGLEHART, supra note 17, at 40-43 & fig. 2-1; Inglehart & Baker, supra note 33, at
23, 24-25 & tbl. 1, 26 tbl. 2; Leonard, supra note 25, at 79
41. This Note follows Professor Goldberg in using the term "morals legislation" in a broad
general sense. Though this Note focuses on morals legislation as popularly described and other laws
with explicit morality-based justifications, it discusses and pertains "to rationales for lawmaking
based on tradition, social conventions, decency, ethics, majoritarian disgust, and other similar senti-
ments. That is, to the extent these positions reflect theoretical positions about the dividing line
between good and bad, they present courts with challenges like those triggered by morals-based
rationales." Goldberg, supra note 8, at 1242-43 (citations omitted).
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that a developmental approach to constitutional review of morals legislation,
while consistent with many aspects of the common responses to morality
and the law after Lawrence, yields significant advantages over those ap-
proaches. Most significantly, Part II argues that a developmental approach
lends reliability and determinability to the use of evolving standards in con-
stitutional review of morals legislation, while still maintaining primary state
control over public health, safety, and morals. Part III applies this frame-
work to questions raised by Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence, arguing
that the Court is indeed likely to strike down certain laws as unconstitutional
while others appear to pass developmental and constitutional muster.
I. THE PATTERN: THE CONSTITUTION AS A STAGE FIVE DOCUMENT
If, as described above, stages of moral development are the structures
within which individuals and groups reason, make, and justify moral deci-
sions, it would be instructive to examine which stages of development are at
work in adjudication and constitutional interpretation. This Part defends the
thesis that over recent decades, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld
morals legislation justified by stage five reasoning and has consistently
struck down as unconstitutional morals legislation justified only by stage
four reasoning. Sections I.A, I.B, and I.C argue that this principle is consis-
tent with the Court's morals legislation cases involving matters of race,
gender, and other group classifications, respectively. Subsequent sections
show that stage five moral development accurately describes the Court's
decisions involving specific behaviors. Section I.D shows that the thesis
holds for decisions regarding adult entertainment, and Section I.E shows
that the thesis holds for cases concerning assisted suicide. Section I.F re-
turns to Lawrence and its predecessors, arguing that the Court's decision
striking down the Texas law banning sodomy also supports the thesis. Sec-
tion I.G concludes Part I by outlining some instances where the Court may
have moved beyond stage five structures and reasoning.
A. Race
• 41
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court has
consistently struck down laws justified by ethnocentricism, an element of
stage four moral reasoning. While it might not appear at first blush that
• 41
Brown is a case involving morals legislation, much of its progeny consid-
ered morals legislation directly. In Loving v. Virginia,44 for example, the
Court struck down Virginia's anti-miscegenation law justified on grounds of
preserving racial integrity and preventing a "mongrel breed of citizens.' ' 5
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. But recall that laws justified by tradition and social conventions, active in Brown, are
properly within the scope of this Note. See supra note 41.
44. 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
45. Id. at 7.
[Vol. 105:151
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Virginia justified its law using ethnocentric stage four moral reasoning-the
state must keep races separate simply to preserve racial divisions-and the
46Court found it unconstitutional despite "equal application" of the law. In
Brown, Loving, and related cases, 7 the message has been clear: stage four
ethnocentrism is an unconstitutional justification for classifications by race.
This conclusion may seem obvious, as the great weight of late-twentieth
Century jurisprudence made racial discrimination unconstitutional; in other
cases, however, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of racial
discrimination if rooted in stage five moral structures. As a prime example,
in Washington v. Davis,4s the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Dis-
trict of Columbia police department's use of a verbal skills test given to
police recruits that had the effect of screening out more black applicants
than white applicants. 49 The Davis Court repeated the principle that "[a]
statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of race."5° "[A]n invidious discriminatory pur-
pose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including
the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than an-
other."'" The court found it "untenable," however, that the Constitution
prevents the government from seeking applicants with better communicative
abilities, "particularly where the job requires special ability to communicate
orally and in writing."52 It was constitutional to screen out a greater number
of black applicants if the screening process related to ability, merit, and
achievement, all core stage five values. 3
Thus, with Davis and similar cases,5 4 the Supreme Court "reaffirmed the
nation's commitment to merit and the idea that people ought to be able to
46. Id. at 8 ("[W]e reject the notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing
racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's
proscription of all invidious racial discriminations... "); see also Jay Michaelson, On Listening to
the Kulturkampf, or, How America Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though Romer v. Evans
Didn't, 49 DuKE L.J. 1559, 1613 (2000) ("[A]s Loving must tell us, a state's 'moral' choice can
sometimes be constitutionally wrong.").
47. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984) ("The effects of racial prejudice,
however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its
natural mother found to be an appropriate person to have such custody."); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 184 (1964) (invalidating a law prohibiting an unmarried interracial couple from "ha-
bitually liv[ing] in and occupy[ing] in the nighttime the same room").
48. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
49. Id. at 245-46.
50. Id. at 241.
51. Id. at 242.
52. Id. at 245, 246.
53. Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 482.
54. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE CONTINUITY OF CHANGE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 1953-1986, at 229-32 (1991), for a good discussion of Davis and related
cases, including Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980);
and City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
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compete for jobs on the basis of their ability" 55 -in other words, the Court
reaffirmed justifications based on stage five moral reasoning. But, "[i]f the
plaintiff[ ] could make out a case for intentional discrimination, then such
action violated the constitutional promise of equal protection"56--in other
words, if plaintiff could persuade the Court that stage four moral reasoning
was actually at work, the law or policy would be deemed unconstitutional.
B. Gender
The sociocentrism of stage four moral development need not take the
form of ethnocentrism rooted in racial classifications. One might just as eas-
ily define social groups by gender rather than race. Stage four sociocentrism
tends to separate men and women into distinct social and legal spheres. 7
With the emergence of stage five, however, one can no longer justify grant-
ing certain rights to men alone based on stage four traditions and social58
norms. The worldcentric stance of stage five incorporates rights for women
as well.
Along these stage five lines, the Supreme Court has generally struck
down laws that granted men rights, opportunities, or advantages to the ex-
clusion of women. In Stanton v. Stanton,59 for example, the Supreme Court
rejected the state court's reliance on "old notions" of gender roles in invali-
dating a Utah law that granted child support payments to male children until
61age 21, but female children only until age 18.60 In Kirchberg v. Feenstra,
the Court struck down a Louisiana law that gave a husband, as "head and
master" of the household, power to dispose of jointly owned marital prop-
erty without his wife's consent. 62 This general pattern-overturning laws
that gave legal preferences to men-has held steady from the 1970s through
61the past decade.
55. UROFSKY, supra note 54, at 231.
56. Id.
57. RAY & ANDERSON, supra note 33, at 31 (including "[mien need to keep their traditional
roles and women need to keep theirs" among the list of values that define traditionals); Sex, Ecology,
Spirituality, supra note 20, at 397-98; cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's Jurisprudence of
Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1084
(2004) (arguing that "traditionalist" societies maintained social divisions between men and women).
58. TOE, supra note 13, at 81. With the emergence of postconventional and worldcentric
awareness in stage five, moral justifications rest on "[wihat is right and fair... for all peoples, re-
gardless of race, religion, sex, or creed." Id. at 20.
59. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
60. Id. at 14-15.
61. 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
62. Id. at 457, 459-61.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down Virginia's policy
of admitting only men to Virginia Military Institute); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-
85, (1973) (rejecting stage four "romantic paternalism" and "gross, stereotyped distinctions" in
striking down a law making it more difficult for a woman to claim her husband as a dependent than
for a man to claim his wife); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down an Idaho statute that
provided a preference for males over females of equal degrees of relationship to be appointed to
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The Supreme Court has also struck down laws that arguably benefited
women when those laws were justified by stage four sociocentric traditions
and social norms. In Orr v. Orr,64 the Court invalidated an Alabama law that
exempted women from paying any potential alimony to their ex-husbands
after divorce. 65 The Court, relying on Stanton, accepted that any justification
based on "old notions" or the state's preference for wives playing "depend-
ent role[s]" could not survive constitutional review. Similarly, in
61Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court struck down the
School of Nursing's policy of excluding males from admission, finding that
it "tend[ed] to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively
women's job.' 6 In these cases and similar recent decisions,69 the Court fur-
ther solidified the notion that laws that "merely perpetuated traditional
stereotypes about women and their roles in society ... would fail an equal
protection analysis. '70 That is, laws justified by the assumptions and stereo-
types of traditionalist stage four moral reasoning are unconstitutional,
regardless of whether men or women benefit.
Just as in decisions concerning race, however, the Supreme Court has
upheld the constitutionality of gender discrimination when rooted in stage
five moral structures. In Schlesinger v. Ballard,7' the Court upheld a statute
providing female officers a longer period of time to attain promotion before
facing discharge, explaining that the disparate treatment reflected "not ar-
chaic and overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that
male and female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with re-
spect to opportunities for professional service., 72 Hypothetico-deductive and
administer an estate). This marked a reversal from the Court's earlier approach. See, e.g., Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (upholding the right of the Illinois Supreme Court to deny a person's
application for a license to practice law because she was a married woman).
64. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
65. Id. at 282-83.
66. Id. at 279-80. The Court went on to analyze Alabama's other asserted justifications,
finding that they would have been just as well served by a gender-neutral classification. Id. at 283.
In a carefully worded footnote, the Court suggested that those asserted justifications might have
been disingenuous. Id. at 280 n. 10.
67. 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
68. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729.
69. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (striking down a federal law requir-
ing a stricter standard to pay benefits to widowers than to widows); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (striking down an Oklahoma statute allowing the sale of 3.2% beer to females 18 years or
older, but prohibiting sales to males until the age of 21). This marked another reversal from the
Court's earlier approach. See, e.g., Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912) (upholding a
Montana statute exempting laundries owned by women from a licensing fee); Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding an Oregon law setting maximum hours for women).
70. UROFSKY, supra note 54, at 246; see also DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATE-
RIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 348 (3d ed. 2003) ("[The Supreme Court] generally strike[s] down
laws that deny women opportunities that men have ... or that deny men opportunities that women
have when the state was motivated by archaic stereotypes......
71. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
72. Id. at 508. The Court detailed how male and female officers are not similarly situated:
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objective modes of thinking and rational, scientific inquiry-stage five
structures-produce the "demonstrable fact" that justifies the statute, not
"archaic" stage four sociocentrism. In Michael M. v. Superior Court of So-
noma County,73 the Court nicely summarized this line of jurisprudence:
"[T]his Court has consistently upheld statutes where the gender classifica-
tion is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are
not similarly situated in certain circumstances."7 4 Or, in developmental
terms: the Court has consistently upheld gender classification based on de-
monstrable facts indicative of worldcentric stage five values.75
This is not merely a matter of semantics. As Professor Goldberg ex-
plained:
Because fact-based reasoning ... tends to be publicly accessible, a court
potentially will be exposed to greater scrutiny-and greater criticism-by
both dissenting judges and the general public if it accepts dubious facts to
Specifically, "women may not be assigned to duty in aircraft that are engaged in combat mis-
sions nor may they be assigned to duty on vessels of the Navy other than hospital ships and
transports." Thus, in competing for promotion, female lieutenants will not generally have
compiled records of seagoing service comparable to those of male lieutenants.
Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 6015). Petitioner did not challenge the restrictions on women officers'
participation in combat and sea duty. Id.
73. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). The Court upheld a California statute making only men potentially
criminally responsible for statutory rape, with the plurality opinion reasoning that the statute was
substantially related to the important state interest of preventing illegitimate pregnancy. Id. at 470-
72. Some have criticized Michael M. and statutory rape laws in general as reinforcing gender stereo-
types. See, e.g., Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L.
REV. 387, 404-06, 413-32 (1984) ("In terms of rights theory, gender-based statutory rape laws
violate the right of all women to be treated equally to men."). But see Catherine MacKinnon, Reflec-
tions on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1304-06 (1991) (arguing that both the
plurality opinion and the dissent in Michael M. missed the point that "[w]omen and men are not
similarly situated with regard to sexual assault in the sense that they are not equally subject to it or
equally subjected to it."). For the purposes of this Note, the important point is that the Court explic-
itly avoided relying on stage four stereotypes or social norms, but instead used stage five
hypothetico-deductive, scientific reasoning. See infra text accompanying note 76. How accurate the
Court's reasoning is an issue for another Note.
74. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (plurality opinion); cf United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 533 (1996) ("'Inherent differences' between men and women, we have come to appreciate,
remain cause for celebration ...."); UROFSKY, supra note 54, at 246-47 (discussing the Court's
approach to employment and pregnancy).
75. Again, the complexities of this area of law reflect the complexities of the developmental
approach. Cf supra note 47. This is especially evident in cases concerning women in the military. In
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), for example, the Court upheld a law limiting registration
for selective service to males. The Court found that Congress permissibly relied on the demonstrable
fact that any future draft would be characterized by a need for combat troops, and since women
were not eligible for combat, there was no need to require women to register for selective service.
Id. at 76. However, the Court did not investigate whether that underlying difference in combat status
was justified by stage four stereotypes and social norms or stage five demonstrable facts. In this
case, then, there was no clear line between stage four and stage five reasoning.
In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), the Court upheld a Massachusetts
law giving preference for state civil service positions to veterans, who were overwhelmingly male.
The Court rested its decision on its finding that there was no discriminatory intent towards women,
again without investigating the underlying differences in military status between men and women.
Id. at 279-80. While Feeney's intent requirement is consistent with stage five reasoning, see supra
notes 49-55 and accompanying text, the line between stage four and stage five blurs when, as here,
stage four stereotypes may loom in the background of a decision resting on stage five reasoning.
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allow a traditional moral regulation to survive. This, in turn, may have a
constraining effect on courts otherwise inclined to accept nonlegitimate or
nonexplanatory morals rationales.1
6
That is, the Court's use of language reflective of stage five is itself a
catalyst for deeper reliance on stage five reasoning and values.
C. Other Groups
Even in situations that do not call for heightened scrutiny, the Supreme
Court has struck down group classifications motivated by stage four socio-
centrism. In USDA v. Moreno, the Supreme Court struck down a provision
of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 that barred food subsidies to any household
containing an individual unrelated to any other member of the household. 8
Legislative history indicated that the provision "was intended to prevent so-
called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from participating in the food stamp
program.,' 79 The Court held that this could not pass constitutional muster, as
"a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest."80 Or, in development terms, a
law justified by a stage four preference for one social group over another is
unconstitutional.
One might also exercise stage four sociocentrism by defining social
groups by presence or absence of disability. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center,8 ' the Court found that the City of Cleburne had violated the
Equal Protection Clause by requiring Cleburne Living Center to obtain a
special use permit before establishing a group home for the developmentally
disabled. s2The Court noted that two of the Cleburne City Council's objec-
tions to the facility were premised on the negative attitudes and fears of
neighborhood residents and the fear that nearby junior high school students
might harass the occupants of the group home. 3 The Court made short shrift
of objections rooted in stage four sociocentrism, rejecting classifications
based on "mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which
are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding . . . . 8Another of the City
76. Goldberg, supra note 8, at 1309-10 (footnotes omitted).
77. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
78. Id. at 529.
79. Id. at 534.
80. Id. In the district court, the government had explicitly argued that this provision might be
justified as promoting morality. Id. at 535 n.7.
81. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
82. Id. at 450.
83. Id. at 448-49.
84. Id. at 448. This bears striking resemblance to the principles applied to the race context in
Palmore, a case that the Cleburne opinion cited with approval. Id.
Justice Stevens made this point even more forcefully in his concurrence:
[T]he Court of Appeals correctly observed that through ignorance and prejudice the mentally
retarded "have been subjected to a history of unfair and often grotesque mistreatment."... The
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Council's objections was that the home would have too many occupants for
its size, despite the fact that the same number of non-disabled occupants
would not violate the zoning ordinance." Here, the Court looked for any
objective, rational, stage five justification for treating the developmentally
disabled differently, but found none:
It is true that they suffer disability not shared by others; but why this dif-
ference warrants a density regulation that others need not observe is not at
all apparent. At least this record does not clarify how, in this connection,
the characteristics of the intended occupants of the [group home] ration-
ally justify denying to those occupants what would be permitted to groups
occupying the same site for different purposes."
In Cleburne, though, the Court hinted that such objective, scientific,
non-sociocentric justifications do exist for treating the developmentally dis-
abled differently in certain cases.17 Just such a case arose in the form of
Heller v. Doe.8 Under Kentucky law, both mentally retarded and mentally ill
persons could be involuntarily committed to a mental institution if: (1) the
person presented a danger or threat of danger to themselves or others;
(2) placement in a residential treatment center was the least restrictive
method of treatment; and (3) the person could reasonably benefit from resi-
dential treatment. 89 For mentally retarded persons, these three factors had to
be proven by clear and convincing evidence, but for mentally ill persons,
Kentucky law required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.90 The Court, citing
the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders and other expert works on mental illness and mental retar-
dation, accepted Kentucky's argument that mental retardation and any
corresponding danger to self or others is easier to diagnose and a more sta-
record convinces me that this permit was required because of the irrational fears of neighbor-
ing property owners ....
Id. at 454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Clebume Living Ctr. v. Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197
(5th Cir. 1984)). This broke with the Court's earlier approach. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205
(1927) (upholding a Virginia statute allowing the involuntary sterilization of "mental defectives" in
order to promote the "welfare of society").
85. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449.
86. Id. at 449-50 (emphasis added).
87. For example:
[Tlhose who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the eve-
ryday world. Nor are they all cut from the same pattern: as the testimony in this record
indicates, they range from those whose disability is not immediately evident to those who must
be constantly cared for. They are thus different, immutably so, in relevant respects, and the
States' interest in dealing with and providing for them is plainly a legitimate one.
Id. at 442 (footnotes omitted).
88. 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
89. Id. at317-18.
90. Id.
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ble condition than mental illness.9' Thus, the Court found objective, demon-
strable facts that supported a hypothetico-deductive stage five justification
for providing a higher standard of proof in mental illness cases: to ensure
against the heightened risk that a person would be involuntarily committed.92
D. Adult Entertainment
At first glance, restrictions on adult entertainment might appear firmly
rooted in stage four social norms and absolutist principles of right and
wrong.93 In 1973, the Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of
a state law banning theaters from showing obscene films in Paris Adult
Theatre v. Slaton.94 In upholding the Georgia law, the Court did indeed give
deference to the notion that a state could act to protect "the social interest in
order and morality."9' The Court's reasoning, however, revealed that its con-
ception of morality was not wholly rooted in stage four absolutist principles
of right and wrong, but mixed with stage five objectivity:
The issue in this context goes beyond whether someone, or even the major-
ity, considers the conduct depicted as "wrong" or "sinful." The States have
the power to make a morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of ob-
scene material, or commerce in such material, has a tendency to injure the
community as a whole, to endanger the public safety, or to jeopardize, in
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's words, the States' "right... to maintain a de-
cent society.
'96
91. Id. at 321-24; see also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATIS-
TICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41-49, 297-534 (4th ed. text revision, 2000) (detailing
different diagnostic and other criteria for mental retardation and various mental illnesses).
92. Heller, 509 U.S. at 322-23.
93. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene .... It
has been well observed ... that any benefit that may be derived from [such utterances] is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.") (footnote omitted); Goldberg, supra note
8, at 1268 ("Given both the moralistic terms of the public debate about sexually explicit entertain-
ment and the Court's strong rhetorical support for morals-based lawmaking, the argument that a
majority of the Court has not relied exclusively on morals rationales in the last fifty years, other than
in Bowers, may be somewhat surprising.") (footnotes omitted); Stephen Chapman, When Censor-
ship Isn't Censorship; The Debate Over Public Nudity, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 2, 2000, at C21 (quoting an
Erie, Pennsylvania council member: "We're not prohibiting nudity, we're prohibiting nudity when
it's used in a lewd and immoral fashion"); Jodi Wilgoren & Kimberly Sanchez, Strip Club Defies
City, Opens Doors, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1996, at B I (quoting one citizen in opposing a local strip
club: "We're fighting too many other things without this one that's immoral and will do nothing for
our neighborhood"). Notice that these excerpts equate morality with stage four moral conceptions-
social norms and absolutist principles of right and wrong. Cf. supra note 28-31 and accompanying
text.
94. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
95. Id. at 61 (quoting Roth v. US, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)).
96. Id. at 69 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissent-
ing)) (alteration in original). One might wonder, however, how exactly one can make a "morally
neutral judgment" that a certain activity injures the community or endangers public safety. See supra
notes 9-11 and accompanying text. This is quite easy to understand, however, if "morally neutral
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A more recent case has further solidified the Supreme Court's reliance
on stage five structures and reasoning in the context of adult entertainment.
In City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 9 the Court upheld Erie, Pennsylvania's ordi-
nance banning public nudity against a challenge from a nude dancing
business." The plurality opinion found that Erie's ban was justified in order
to combat the "harmful secondary effects" of nude dancing identified in
previous case law 99 and the City of Erie's own findings.'0° Thus, even in a
context where the Court could allow stage four social norms and absolutist
principles of right and wrong to dominate and reach the same result,10' the
Court has felt the need to rely on demonstrable facts, representative of stage
five reasoning.' °2
E. Assisted Suicide
Assisted suicide, like adult entertainment, is an issue in which one might
expect the debate to center around stage four absolutist and fundamentalist
reasoning. When the Supreme Court addressed the issue, however, stage five
principles again dominated the opinion. In Washington v. Glucksberg,'3 the
Court upheld Washington's assisted suicide ban with a list of justifications
including preserving life, preventing suicide, protecting the integrity and
ethics of the medical profession, protecting vulnerable groups, and avoiding
judgment" is understood to mean resting on stage five objective and hypothetico-deductive struc-
tures, as opposed to stage four absolutist principles of right and wrong.
97. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
98. Id. at 283; see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (upholding an
Indiana public indecency statute that restricted nude dancing).
99. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 296-97 ("Because the nude dancing at [Pap's A.M.] is of the
same character as the adult entertainment at issue in [Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986), Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and California v. LaRue, 409
U.S. 109 (1972)], it was reasonable for Erie to conclude that such nude dancing was likely to pro-
duce the same secondary effects.").
100. Id. at 293 ("In any event, Erie also relied on its own findings. The preamble to the ordi-
nance states that 'the Council of the City of Erie has, at various times over more than a century,
expressed its findings that certain lewd, immoral activities carried on in public places for profit are
highly detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare, and lead to the debasement of both
women and men, promote violence, public intoxication, prostitution and other serious criminal
activity."') (quoting Petition for Cert., Pap's A.M.) (emphasis added in Pap's A.M.). Even if this
reasoning appears weak, the appeal to stage five demonstrable facts and evidence is significant. See
supra note 76 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Our society prohibits, and all
human societies have prohibited, certain activities... because they are considered, in the traditional
phrase, 'contra bonos mores,' i.e., immoral.").
102. That is, the results in these cases would be the same whether the Court allowed states to
rest on a stage four justification (e.g. "Nude dancing should be banned because the state says it is
wrong.") or required a stage five justification (e.g. "Nude dancing should be banned because find-
ings show it may be harmful to public health and safety."). See supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text; see also Eskridge, supra note 57, at 1084 ("Modem society can have morals
legislation just as premodern society can, but it has to be justified along socially instrumental
lines."); Goldberg, supra note 8, at 1268-74 (arguing that the Court has abandoned "morals ration-
ales" for "secondary-effects analysis" in adult entertainment cases).
103. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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movement towards euthanasia. In considering the state's interest in pre-
venting suicide, for example, the Court cited numerous studies showing that
suicide itself was a "serious public-health problem."'05 The Court further
noted that those who attempt suicide or request assisted suicide often suffer
from depression or other mental disorders and that legalized assisted suicide
may actually decrease the likelihood of those persons getting effective06
treatment. Working through the other justifications on the list in the same
manner, the Court found objective, demonstrable stage five justifications for
Washington's ban on assisted suicide and upheld the law.
Of course, there may also be stage five justifications for upholding a law
allowing assisted suicide. While a given stage's structures may be universal,
the content-the specific decisions reached using a given stage's struc-
tures-may vary greatly. '07 Also, the primary justification raised in
Glucksberg, preserving life, can take on a number of different forms when
approached from stages four, five, or six.'08 Even as it found stage five justi-
fications to support the Oregon law's constitutionality, the Court seemed to
recognize that assisted suicide does not fall neatly along developmental
stage lines: "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest
and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physi-
cian-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue .... "'09
F. Sodomy and Sexuality
Surprisingly, the two pre-Lawrence cases that dealt with sodomy and sex-
ual orientation did not engage in the type of stage five analysis seen in cases
previously discussed. In Bowers v. Hardwick,"o the Court spent the vast ma-
jority of its discussion weighing whether or not sodomy was a fundamental
right under substantive due process analysis.'" The Court spent but a single
five-sentence paragraph discussing the justifications for Georgia's law ban-
ning sodomy, concluding:
The law ... is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws rep-
resenting essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due
Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. Even respondent
104. Id. at 728-35; cf Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808-09 (1997) (upholding a similar New
York law resting on similar justifications).
105. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730.
106. Id. at 730-31.
107. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Lawrence Kohlberg & Donald Elfenbein, Capital Punishment, Moral Devel-
opment, and the Constitution, in LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, I ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 243 (1981).
109. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735. Perhaps this helps explain the number and variety of con-
currences in Glucksberg. Id. at 736-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring; Stevens, J., concurring; Souter, J.,
concurring; Ginsburg, J., concurring; Breyer, J., concurring).
110. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
111. Id. at186-96.
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makes no such claim, but insists that majority sentiments about the moral-
ity of homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We do not agree, and
are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 States should be invali-
dated on this basis."
2
Hardwick argued that Georgia must support its law with more than just
an appeal to morality. Without taking a closer look at the state's justification,
the Court rejected the challenge with "[w]e do not agree."
In Romer v. Evans,"3 the Court did not fully address the analysis missing
from Bowers. The Romer Court invalidated an amendment to Colorado's
state constitution, finding, among other problems, that it was "born of ani-
mosity" towards people of homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation."
4
Quoting Moreno, the Court found that the desire to harm a politically un-
popular group-here, a group defined on the basis of sexual orientation-
was not a constitutional justification for the law."5 Previously, however, the
Court had recognized that important differences between men and women
or between various types of mental disabilities might call for unequal treat-
ment in certain situations.1 6 The majority opinion in Romer failed to address
whether differences in sexual orientation might also support unequal treat-
ment. With Bowers still good law at the time, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in
Romer, made a strong argument that "[i]f it is constitutionally permissible
for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitution-
ally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring
homosexual conduct."' '7 After Bowers and Romer, the Court still had not
explicitly discussed whether stage five structures could support laws ban-
ning sodomy or disfavoring people on the basis of sexual orientation."'
112. Id. at 196. But cf Michaelson, supra note 46, at 1613 ("[A]s Loving must tell us, a state's
'moral' choice can sometimes be constitutionally wrong.").
113. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
114. Id. at 632, 634 ("[The amendment's] sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons
offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects ...."). The Court addressed another general flaw making Colorado's amendment unconstitu-
tional: "[T]he amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group, an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legisla-
tion." Id. at 632. This second flaw, however, is outside the scope of this Note.
115. Id. at 634-35.
116. See supra notes 72-74, 87-92 and accompanying text.
117. Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. More specifically, at this point the Court had not discussed whether stage five hy-
pothetico-deductive reasoning justified such laws, as Justice Scalia argued in his Romer dissent, or
whether only stage four sociocentrism supported them, as the Romer opinion suggested. In particu-
lar, many scholars struggled with the distinction drawn in Moreno and Romer between animus and
legitimate moral judgment. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Proportional Equality: Readings of Romer, 89
Ky. L.J. 885, 902 (2001) ("Is there no distinction between 'animus' and 'morality' except the value
judgments of a given court?"); Matt Larsen, Note, Lawrence v. Texas and Family Law: Gay Parents'
Constitutional Rights in Child Custody Proceedings, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. Am. L. 53, 60-63
(2004). This Note suggests an answer: "animus" is a moral judgment justified only by stage four
reasoning, while judgments justified by stage five reasoning are permissible.
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In this context, the Court revisited the central holding of Bowers in Law-
rence v. Texas."9 Notably, Texas asserted that its goals in banning sodomy
were the "implementation of public morality and promotion of family val-
ues."'2 0 To keep with the long line of precedent discussed above, though, the
Court could not rest on the state's assertion of "public morality" alone. Im-
plicitly, the Court had to determine on its own whether the statute could be
justified as a valid exercise of stage five moral reasoning or an unconstitu-
tional implementation of stage four moral reasoning.
The Lawrence Court supported its decision with two general stage five
themes. First, the Court repeatedly invoked the privacy ideal, especially as it
relates to personal relationships, in postconventional stage five language. For
instance, after criticizing the Bowers Court's "failure to appreciate the extent
of the liberty at stake,"' ' 2 ' the Court counseled "against attempts by the State
•.. to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent
injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects." 22 Later, the
Court reiterated that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept.., of existence, of meaning.' ' 23 These statements are strikingly simi-
lar to a description of stage five: "[T]he self 'escapes' from the 'herd
mentality' of [stage four], and seeks truth and meaning in individualistic
terms . .,124
Second, the Lawrence opinion consistently maintained Romer's
worldcentric reasoning in granting privacy to people without regard to sexual
orientation.'25 The Court stated, for example, that "[p]ersons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for [intimate and personal choices], just as
heterosexual persons do.' 26 This is "consistent with the norm that homo-
sexuality is a tolerable sexual variation"' 127 and in line with mainstream
psychology's approach to sexual orientation-"that homosexuality, in itself,
119. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
120. Brief of Respondent at 4, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 550 (No. 02-102).
121. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)); see also id.
at 578 ("[I]ndividual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical rela-
tionship ... are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married
persons.") (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
124. Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 482; see also infra notes 141-143 and accompa-
nying text.
125. See Marc Spindelman, The Boundaries of Liberty after Lawrence v. Texas: Surviving
Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MIcH. L. REV. 1615, 1619-32 (2004) (arguing that the Lawrence Court
accepted the "like-straight" argument that "[glays are just like heterosexuals.").
126. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574; see also id. at 578 ("The case ... involve[s] two adults who
... engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.... The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.").
127. Eskridge, supra note 57, at 1065.
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[is] not a mental disorder."2 Absent any demonstrable, scientific justification
that this type of private conduct is more or less wrong or harmful depending
on the sexual orientation of the actors, the Court found that Texas's law was
based on stage four absolutism and sociocentrism--defining a social group by
sexual orientation, with no stage five reasoning to support the distinction-
and struck it down as unconstitutional. 2 9
The Court summarized its holding with the quote that seemed to throw
the entire spectrum of morals legislation into doubt: "[T]he fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice .... ,.30 In developmental terms, however, it takes on a more benign
form, consistent with decades of morals legislation jurisprudence: The fact
that the governing majority in a State has viewed a particular practice as
immoral via stage four reasoning is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice."'
128. Jack Drescher et al., Homosexuality, Gay and Lesbian Identities, and Homosexual Be-
havior, in 1 KAPLAN & SADOCK'S COMPREHENSVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1936, 1941
(Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock eds., 8th ed. 2005). This is yet another context that re-
veals the complex interaction between developmental stages. Stage five reasoning relies, in part, on
"natural laws" that can be learned and mastered. Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 482. Thus,
someone using a mix of stage four and stage five reasoning might deduce that non-conformist ho-
mosexual conduct violates natural laws as deviant behavior. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL DISORDERS 7, 121 (1952) (desig-
nating homosexuality as "sexual deviation" and a "sociopathic personality disturbance"). Over time,
however, this natural law rationale collapsed as stage five scientific reasoning broke away from
stage four conformist reasoning. See, e.g., William G. Herron & Mary Jane Herron, The Complexity
of Sexuality, 78 PSYCH. REPORTS 129, 129-30 (1996) (reviewing relevant studies and concluding
that the "interactive position"-positing "a genetic predisposition to sexual orientation that is envi-
ronmentally activated"--is most probable). This idea is further bolstered by the influence of stage
six relativism and tolerance. See generally Drescher et al., supra, at 1938-41, 1944-51 (detailing the
history of psychiatric approaches to sexual orientation and summarizing recent research on the
origins of homosexuality)
129. Notably, individuals and private "expressive associations" may still discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation. In Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), the Court held that a
New Jersey law requiring the Boy Scouts to accept a gay scoutmaster unconstitutionally violated the
group's First Amendment right to freedom of expressive association. Id. at 656. As Professor Huhn
summarized:
Under the First Amendment, people are free to condemn homosexual conduct .... Further-
more ... as a matter of constitutional right, religious and expressive organizations will still be
free to discriminate against homosexuals, and individuals will continue to have a constitutional
right to discriminate against homosexuals when making their own "intimate and personal
choices" such as whom to associate with on a personal basis.
Huhn, supra note 13, at 93.
This is still consistent with Wilber's developmental approach, in which "[t]he health of the en-
tire spiral is the prime directive." TOE, supra note 13, at 56 (emphasis omitted). Each stage is "an
absolutely necessary and desirable element of the overall spiral." Id. at 56; see also id. at 162 n.4.
Freedom of association as guaranteed by the First Amendment is one way in which stage four, a
necessary element of the developmental spiral, may find expression.
130. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
131. In fact, at least two systems-Ronald Inglehart's and Paul Ray and Sherry Ruth Ander-
son's-apply the term "traditional" to the stage that correlates with Spiral Dynamics stage four. See
supra note 33; cf Eskridge, supra note 57, at 1084-85 (arguing that the Supreme Court's morals
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G. The Emergence of Stage Six
Elements of recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that stage six rea-
soning and increasingly worldcentric values are beginning to enter into the
Court's reasoning. In Palmore v. Sidoti,12 the Court found that the social
stigma attaching to mixed-race families could not constitutionally justify
removing an infant from its natural mother. The Court acknowledged that
racial prejudice, a manifestation of stage four ethnocentrism, may have pro-
found objective, scientifically demonstrable effects. 133 Stage five reasoning
takes such effects into account.134 Stage five reasoning, however, also begins
to emphasize worldcentric values, 35 supplanting stage four's sociocentrism,
and worldcentrism carries even greater emphasis in stage six reasoning.1
36
Thus in Palmore, though demonstrable harms brought about by society's
ethnocentrism supported the state's action, the Court found that stage five
and six worldcentric ideals took precedence over stage five demonstrable
harms.
137
Likewise, in the context of gender, it is not always apparent whether a
law that benefits women is justified by stage four sociocentrism, by stage
five rationality, or by stage six egalitarianism, diversity, and antihierarchical
values. 13 The Court has generally upheld "laws benefiting women when the
Court believes the state was motivated by remedial justifications rather than
archaic stereotypes,' 39 but the constitutionality of laws motivated by reme-
dial justifications suggests that the Court is giving precedence to stage six's
egalitarianism and diversity over stage five's reliance on merit.'40
Privacy, which weighed heavily in Lawrence, is also not an idea that falls
neatly along developmental lines. Increased emphasis on privacy concerns,
though, suggests that stage six reasoning is at work. Privacy concerns first
become meaningful in stage five reasoning, with that stage's emphasis on
individuality and autonomy. ' Privacy concerns are even more important in
legislation jurisprudence is that of a modem society, as defined by Max Weber, rather than that of a
premodern or "traditionalist" society).
132. 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984).
133. Id. at 434.
134. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 27.
137. Though beyond the scope of this Note, the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence re-
veals a similarly complex-if not more complex-interaction between developmental stages. See,
e.g., Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, supra note 20, at 765 n. 13.
138. See TOE, supra note 13, at 9-11. Consider, for example, the issue of the role of women
in the military, where traditional stereotypes and social norms, demonstrable physical differences,
and emerging emphasis on diversity and egalitarianism converge and clash. See supra note 75.
139. FARBER ET AL., supra note 70, at 348.
140. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
141. Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 482.
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stage six reasoning, as postconventional values carry even greater weight.
Different individuals using stage five or stage six moral reasoning may put
more or less emphasis on personal or collective social or cultural ends,'
4
1
affecting the relative importance of privacy concerns in moral reasoning, but
the Court's increasing emphasis on privacy may further signal that stage six
reasoning is entering morals legislation jurisprudence.
These examples are not nearly conclusive, of course. Development
moves slowly, and it will be many more decades before we can say with any
certainty that the Court has embraced stage six values. But these examples,
together with the stage four/stage five pattern already outlined, suggest that
developmentalism may indeed be a useful descriptive tool in this area.
H. THE RESPONSE: ADVANTAGES OF A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH AND
PARALLELS WITH OTHER REACTIONS TO LAWRENCE
The developmental understanding of constitutional review of morals leg-
islation described in Part I is little more than a mental exercise unless it has
some advantage over other approaches. This Part argues that a developmen-
tal approach, as a descriptive matter, contains important truths missing from
other responses to Lawrence. Section II.A argues that a developmental ap-
proach is largely consistent with the most common responses to Lawrence,
but yields significant advantages as well. Section I1.B examines the most
significant advantage of a developmental approach, arguing that it lends
reliability and determinability to the use of evolving standards in constitu-
tional review of morals legislation while still maintaining primary state
control over public health, safety, and morals.
A. Responses to Lawrence
As described in the Introduction, the academic responses to Lawrence
have taken a number of forms. Three of the most common have been:
(1) criticism-unelected judges replaced Texas's moral decision with their
own; (2) disbelief-widespread moral disapproval may still provide a le-
gitimate state interest; and (3) approval-morality alone no longer provides
a sufficient basis for law. Sections II.A. 1, 2, and 3 discuss each of these re-
sponses in turn, arguing that each contains an element of truth that the a
developmental approach includes and expands upon.
1. Criticism
One common response to Lawrence has been criticism that the Supreme
Court merely replaced a state legislature's moral decision with its own. As
142. See TOE, supra note 13, at 15 ("[Stage six] sanctions for truth and goodness are estab-
lished largely by individual preferences (as long as the individual is not harming others) .... 'You
do your thing, I do mine' is a popular summary of this stance.").
143. See, e.g., TOE, supra note 13, at 166-168 n.7.
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one commentator put it: "The real issue for the Court seems to be its dis-
agreement with the particular morals chosen by Texas."'" Criticisms in the
popular press of "activist" adjudicating followed suit. 4
In the context of a developmental approach, this criticism is partially
true. The Court disagreed with Texas's absolutist and sociocentric stage four
reasoning and, absent a stage five justification, struck down the resulting
legislation as unconstitutional. As detailed in Part I, however, this is consis-
tent with the great weight of morals legislation jurisprudence over the past
half-century; Lawrence is simply the most recent example of the Supreme
Court's adherence to stage five moral reasoning.
2. Disbelief
A second common response has been to hold on to the belief that wide-
spread moral disapproval may still justify a law, despite the Supreme
Court's apparent rejection of this justification. For example, one commenta-
tor suggested: "[W]here moral disapproval is of long enough standing and
still widely agreed upon by most Americans, the Court would be unlikely to
overturn a law reflecting such disapproval .... ,,146 The underlying sentiment
appears to be that the reach of Lawrence will be limited in the years to
come.
Again, this statement is partially true in the context of a developmental
approach. Importantly, though, a developmental approach squares it with
Lawrence and recent morals legislation jurisprudence. A significant portion of
the population operates primarily from stage five.147 Agreement by the vast
majority on moral disapproval of a certain practice likely signals that a sizable
portion of those operating at stage five also disapproves. For example, since
the vast majority of people support a ban on murder, there is quite likely a
144. Blazier, supra note 5, at 38; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text. Of course,
there are other criticisms of Lawrence outside the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Lund & McGinnis,
supra note 5, at 1557 (criticizing Lawrence's reliance on "the most anticonstitutional branch of
constitutional law: substantive due process," a "tissue of sophistries embroidered with a bit of
sophomoric philosophizing," and an "undisciplined approach to law"); Andrew J. Seligsohn, Choos-
ing Liberty Over Equality and Sacrificing Both: Equal Protection and Due Process in Lawrence v.
Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 411, 413 (2004) (arguing that the Court's reliance on substantive
due process rather than equal protection constituted a "major failure").
145. See, e.g., Steve Barrett, Opinion, Attacks on Marriage Must Halt, CHATTANOOGA TIMES
FREE PRESS, Oct. 15, 2003, at B7; Focus on the Family's Dobson Decries 'Concerted Effort to Drive
God Out of the Public Square'; Urges Stand Against Judicial Tyranny, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 17,
2003, available at http://releases.usnewswire.comVGetRelease.asp?id=20888; M.D. Harmon, Defend
Marriage by Passing the Federal Marriage Amendment, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July 21, 2003,
at 9A.
146. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 348; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
147. Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 482 (estimating that 30% of the population oper-
ates from stage five); cf INGLEHART, supra note 17, at 38 tbl. 2-3 (finding that "materialists"
comprised 31% of the U.S. population in 1972-73).
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stage five justification for banning murder. 14 This is not to say that the Su-
preme Court should rely on opinion polls to come to its decisions. Rather, if
the vast majority of Americans disapproves of a certain practice, the gov-
ernment can likely use stage five reasoning to justify a law banning the
practice. Simply by continuing to uphold laws justified by stage five reason-
ing, the Supreme Court will likely not overturn laws reflecting moral
disapproval widely agreed upon by most Americans.
3. Approval
The most common academic response to Lawrence has been to take the
Court's opinion at face value and abandon the idea that morality alone pro-
vides a sufficient basis for law. This has primarily taken two forms. Some
scholars have strictly adhered to John Stuart Mill's harm principle (the "Mil-
lian approach"), 49 arguing that preventing harm to others is the only
constitutional justification for morals legislation. 5° Others have incorporated
aspects of the harm principle without fully embracing it, arguing that morals
legislation must be justified by demonstrable harm, but not necessarily harm
to others (the "broader empirical approach").'5'
These approaches also contain important partial truths embodied in the
developmental approach. Under a scheme regulated by the harm principle,
the government is only able to step in to prevent harm to others. This is con-
sistent with the stage five drive to "seek[] truth and meaning in
individualistic terms" without interference from the government or any so-
cial group.' 5' And if a government applies the harm principle without regard
to social distinctions, as its advocates presumably intend, it is consistent
with stage five worldcentric values.
The Millian approach, however, has two major weaknesses. First, even
its proponents admit that it does not accurately reflect the current state of
the law, only where they believe the law is headed.15 It cannot easily ac-
count for the constitutionality of bans on assisted suicide 54 or the presumed
148. Note, however, that what qualifies as "murder" depends, in part, on one's stage of moral
development. See Kohlberg & Elfenbein, supra note 25 (describing stage-dependent approaches to
capital punishment).
149. See supra note 7.
150. See, e.g., Burgess-Jackson, supra note 8, at 415; Dubber, supra note 8, at 568.
151. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 8, at 1310; Nan D. Hunter, The Boundaries of Liberty
After Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102 MIcH. L.
REV. 1528, 1531 (2004).
152. Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 482. Notice also that the harm principle is an
almost perfect expression of stage six moral reasoning: "[Stage six] sanctions for truth and goodness
are established largely by individual preferences (as long as the individual is not harming others)."
TOE, supra note 13, at 15.
153. See, e.g., Burgess-Jackson, supra note 8, at 415 ("It is not clear whether legal paternal-
ism remains a valid ground of criminal prohibition, since that was not at issue in [Lawrence]. But
the clear movement is toward Millian liberalism.").
154. See Dubber, supra note 8, at 570; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997).
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validity of, for example, helmet laws or prohibitions on private drug use.'55
Second, it is impossible to define what is or is not a harm without moral
judgment. s6 The Millian approach invokes the harm principle while leaving
"harm" mysteriously undefined.
The broader empirical approach improves on the first weakness, but not
the second. By arguing that states must appeal to an "empirical or otherwise
demonstrable harn[]"'57 or an "objective, material referent"'5 8 in order to
justify morals legislation, but not necessarily a harm with respect to a third
party, this approach can account for the constitutionality of certain laws in-
consistent with the harm principle. Still, these "demonstrable harms" go
undefined. One scholar puts this problem in focus, but without offering a
solution:
Consider ... the use of race discrimination to sustain apartheid [and] the
facilitation of murder to preserve a family's honor .... By some, these ac-
tions are considered to be profound harms that endanger both individuals
and society; to others, these same acts are essential to preserving individ-
ual and societal well-being.'59
Even in the broader empirical approach, moral judgment retains a pow-
erful role.
A developmental approach includes all aspects of the broader empirical
approach, but also begins to tackle the task of defining harms. Stage five
objective, experimental, scientific moral reasoning is synonymous with an
appeal to "demonstrable harms" or "objective, material referents." But the
developmental approach goes further, using postconventional and worldcen-
tric values to help define "demonstrable harm." '60 Judges may properly
consider the ethnocentric use of race discrimination to sustain apartheid and
the facilitation of murder to preserve a family's honor as harms violating stage
five worldcentric values, though lower-stage reasoning might justify such ac-
tions as promoting individual, ethnic, or narrow societal well-being.16 In this
way, a developmental approach includes the important truths of the other
approaches and adds a level of descriptive insight that the other approaches
cannot offer.
155. See Lund & McGinnis, supra note 5, at 1585.
156. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
157. Goldberg, supra note 8, at 1240.
158. Hunter, supra note 151, at 1531.
159. Goldberg, supra note 8, at 1303.
160. See, e.g., Integral Psychology, supra note 16, at 547-48 ("[T]he stream of moral devel-
opment.., includes not only principles of moral judgment (Kohlberg) and care (Gilligan)-or how
one reaches a moral decision-but also moral span, or those deemed worthy of being included in the
decision in the first place."); cf Weinstein & DeMarco, supra note 10, at 458 ("For rational-basis
review, we submit, not only does one need a rational relation between the law and the state's interest
(in having the law), one needs to have an argument showing that the interest of the state is legiti-
mate, which should be interpreted at least in part as saying that one must have a plausible argument
for the moral interest and thereby the law").
161. See BECK & COWAN, supra note 20, at 208, 212-13; TOE, supra note 13, at 120.
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B. Evolving Objective Standards
Though many scholars speak fondly of an evolving interpretation of theS • 162
Constitution, the backlash against this approach has grown in recent years.
One common objection is that there is no "guiding principle" with which to
order an evolving interpretation of the Constitution, and constitutional
interpretation thus devolves into personal preference. The evolving Con-
stitution, then, is "relative and discretionary to the sitting bench."'
64
A developmental approach renders this criticism largely ineffective, at
least in the context of morals legislation. Even more striking, a developmen-
tal approach does not just suggest a principle that would lend guidance to
constitutional interpretation if adopted by the Supreme Court. Rather, it
suggests that such a principle already underlies the Supreme Court's recent
morals legislation jurisprudence. Judges interpret constitutional ideas that
do not lend themselves to easy definition-in terms such as "liberty" and
"freedom" and phrases such as "equal protection" and "due process"-with
an eye towards fairness, justice, and cultural values. 6 These ideas carry
fundamentally different meanings at different developmental stages, stages
that all people grow through-including those that carry the title of "judge"
or "justice". '66 But most judges consciously restrain themselves from forcing
their personal views on society. 67 Instead, as described in Part I, the implicit
focus is the stage structure and reasoning, rather than the content, of a par-
ticular law or policy. In this way, judges can-and do-apply evolving
standards in a relatively objective manner, reflecting the universal and in-
variant nature of developmental stages.' 68This is much more than "relative
and discretionary to the sitting bench."
162. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 57, at 1048-51 (arguing that changed circumstances and
legitimacy in the eyes of an evolving citizenship require an evolving interpretation); James E. Flem-
ing, The Scholarship of Frank . Michelman: Lawrence's Republic, 39 TULSA L. REV. 563, 571-72
(2004) (arguing that the Lawrence opinion takes a jurisgenerative approach to tradition as evolving
consensus); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv.
885, 903-04 (1985) (arguing that the framers intended that the Constitution be interpreted in the
common law tradition).
163. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 44-45 (1997).
164. Jessica J. Sage, Comment, Authority of the Law? The Contribution of Secularized Legal
Education to the Moral Crisis of the Profession, 31 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 707, 735 (2004); see also
supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
165. Cf. Michaelson, supra note 46, at 1616 ("Law, in evaluating these scientific and social-
scientific claims, is not 'intruding' upon some sort of autonomous zone of societal debate, moral
theory or scientific fact. Rather, law acts as the appropriate mediator between 'moral' claims which
depend in part on sociology, physiology, and other disciplines for their support, and whose theoreti-
cal underpinnings may trigger constitutional questions.").
166. See, e.g., supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
167. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 355; see also Levine, supra note 12, at 17-19 ("[Morality,
justice, and fairness] should not merely be based on the personal moral code of the judge, but rather
the historically enduring standards of righteous conduct and principles of justice that reflect the best
in our national character.").
168. Supra Part I; supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, a developmental approach keeps judges in an ostensibly judi-
cial role, leaving primary control of the police power to the states.
Traditionally, courts have defined the police power of the states as "the au-
thority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals." 169 A
developmental approach yields a more accurate definition of the modem
police power: the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and mor-
als via stage five reasoning. Following the pattern described in Part I,
judges strike down state actions as unconstitutional only when they violate
constitutional principles interpreted through stage five structures. Within
stage five reasoning and structures, states have wide latitude to set their own
policies and preferences.
Of course, if developmental models can describe constitutional review
of morals legislation, as suggested by the pattern in Part I, a developmental
approach demands more than static reliance on stage five reasoning. A de-
velopmental approach requires us to acknowledge that our modem
understanding of the meaning of justice, freedom, due process, and equal
protection is not absolute, but filtered through stage-specific structures and
reasoning. Stage six reasoning may have already entered into the Supreme
Court's reasoning 17 and scholars have already suggested tests that rest on•177
core stage six values,"' or even higher stage reasoning.7 Assuming that the
developmental approach provides an accurate description, there will remain
a place for lawyers and judges to consider evolving standards and shared
cultural values in determining the constitutionality of morals legislation in
light of open-ended constitutional clauses 1-and they can continue to do so
without resorting to purely personal views and beliefs.
169. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion).
170. This is subject to other constitutional restrictions, of course. See, e.g., Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) ("Although a municipality may enact regulations in the interest of the
public safety, health, welfare or convenience, these may not abridge the individual liberties secured
by the Constitution to those who wish to speak, write, print or circulate information or opinion.")
At least one other scholar has described this stage four/stage five distinction, though not in ex-
plicitly developmental terms. Professor William Eskridge made the distinction along Max Weber's
descriptions of premodem and modem societies, Eskridge, supra note 57, at 1084-85, which Wilber
argues correspond to pre-stage five and stage five, respectively. TOE, supra note 13, at 69, 133; see
also HABERMAS, supra note 16, at 158 (describing "The Modem Age" as embodying "postconven-
tionally structured domains of action" and "general, formal, and rationalized law").
171. See supra Section I.G.
172. See Eskridge, supra note 57, at 1025-26 (arguing that the "jurisprudence of tolerance"
justifies the Lawrence Court's reasoning).
173. See TOE, supra note 13, at 56, 165 n.6 (describing the "prime directive" as "Itihe health
of the entire spiral"-in other words, all stages of development-a test consistent with stage seven
or eight (emphasis omitted)); see also Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, supra note 20, at 640 n.23, 651
n.59, 761 n.13 (describing the "Basic Moral Intuition" and its application along multiple stages of
development).
174. See Post, supra note 12, at 8 ("[Cjonstitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical
relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture."); Levine,
supra note 12, at 17-18, 20-25 (arguing that judges should continue to consider morality, justice,
and fairness in the judicial process, within the constraints of the common law tradition).
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This is not to say that applying a developmental test to constitutional re-
view of morals legislation is easy-if nothing else, the journey from Bowers
to Lawrence proves that it is anything but. This is also not to say that devel-
opmentalism can ever completely determine the constitutionality of morals
legislation-at the very least, there may be independent constitutional bars
to otherwise justifiable legislation,' and even authorities in developmental-
ism acknowledge that other important factors influence moral decisions.'7 6 It
is to say that a developmental understanding, as a descriptive matter, yields
important insights into constitutional review of morals legislation-insights
missing from the current discussion.
7
Ill. THE OUTLOOK: UNSETTLED QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MORALS LEGISLATION
This Part concludes this Note with an eye towards potential challenges
to morals legislation in the years and decades to come. This Part applies a
developmental framework to three examples of morals legislation that Jus-
tice Scalia called into question in his Lawrence dissent."' Section III.A
predicts that the Court will likely find laws against fornication unconstitu-
tional, Section III.B argues that the Court will likely find that bans on
bestiality pass developmental and constitutional scrutiny, and Section III.C
argues that a Court applying stage five moral reasoning will also uphold
laws against prostitution, though applying stage six reasoning may yield less
support.
175. For example, a law banning all firearms might be justified on stage five empirical evi-
dence and logical proof, but the Second Amendment provides a constitutional bar to such a law.
176. See, e.g., SHAFFER, supra note 17, at 337 ("[B]ecause Kohlberg concentrated so heavily
on moral reasoning, we must rely on other perspectives to help us to understand how moral affect
and moral behavior develop, and how thought, emotions, and behavior interact .... ); TOE, supra
note 13, at 53-54 (detailing at least eight major elements of an "integral model"); see also HABER-
MAS, supra note 16, at 168-69 ("World views ... are highly complex formations that are determined
by cognitive, linguistic, and moral-practical forms of consciousness; the composition and the inter-
play of the structures is not fixed once and for all."); Kohlberg, Current Statement, supra note 23, at
485-86 ("[M]oral stages [are] part of a general cognitive-developmental approach to an evolving
unitary self oriented to a unitary social world.").
177. Even acknowledging the developmental pattern and framework, one can still argue
whether the courts should be involved in moral decisions at all, or whether courts should give
changing interpretations of unclear constitutional terms and phrases any weight at all, as normative
matters. These arguments are outside the scope of this Note.
178. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("State laws against bigamy, same-
sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity
are... sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single
one of these laws is called into question by today's decision....").
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A. Fornication
For present purposes, fornication is sexual intercourse between two un-
married consenting adults."' Under this definition, the only factor that
distinguishes fornication from permissible marital sexual intercourse is that
the two actors are not married. Assuming that a state could not bar marital
sexual intercourse without violating established privacy rights, 180 laws
against fornication cannot pass a stage five test unless demonstrable evi-
dence or logical proof supports protecting different degrees of privacy based
on marital status.
If the Supreme Court continues to apply stage five reasoning, it will
likely find that the marital status distinction does not support upholding the
law. The most common asserted reasons for laws against fornication-to
prevent unwanted pregnancies and ensure proper child rearing-will likely
fail because there is only a tenuous connection between the marital status of
sexual partners and poor child rearing or unwanted pregnancies.18' And the
Supreme Court has already addressed the marital status distinction with
worldcentric reasoning, in Eisenstadt v. Baird:1
2
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of
its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellec-
tual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.
83
Differences in marital status do not support granting different degrees of
privacy concerning contraception, and the tenuous connections between dif-
ferences in marital status and unwanted pregnancies or poor child rearing do
not support a change in this reasoning in the context of sexual intercourse.
The key point here, though, is that if the Court continues to apply stage
five reasoning, its focus will be on whether the connections between
differences in marital status and unwanted pregnancies or poor child rearing
are strong enough, weighed against privacy rights, to support laws against
179. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 16-6-18 (2004) ("An unmarried person commits the offense of
fornication when he voluntarily has sexual intercourse with another person ..... '); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.34 (2005) ("When any man and single woman have sexual intercourse with each other, each is
guilty of fornication .... ).
180. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (holding that a law forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally
intruded upon the right of marital privacy).
181. Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre- and Extramari-
tal Sex, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1669-70 (1991) (detailing how fornication statutes
underinclusively and overinclusively protect against unwanted pregnancies and poor child rearing
and concluding "fornication statutes are not sufficiently tailored to these interests to pass constitu-
tional muster").
182. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
183. Id. at 453; see also Edward Stein, Introducing Lawrence v. Texas: Some Background and
a Glimpse of the Future, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 281-82 (2004).
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fornication. Stage four absolutist moral principles of right and wrong will
not enter into the analysis.
B. Bestiality
Stage five reasoning may support the constitutionality of bans on besti-
ality. Some people argue that "forced sex by a human with an animal
constitutes human imposition upon the animal"' 4and extend the protections
against this conduct afforded to people under the law to animals as well,
using broad worldcentric reasoning that sweeps animals together with peo-
ple into the collection of beings for which they consider what is "right and
fair.'"'5 Further, an ever-growing body of scholarship links bestiality to sex-
ual assault on children or sexual assault generally.16 One may accept these
rationales to justify a ban on bestiality and need not rely on absolutist moral
principles of right and wrong. Again, the focus will be on the strength of
these connections, not on stage four right/wrong absolutism.
C. Prostitution
Stage five reasoning can also support laws banning prostitution. Gener-
ally, two categories of demonstrable facts support such bans. First, evidence
shows that prostitution has harmful secondary effects similar to those cited
in the adult entertainment cases, such as increased crime and loss of sales
for surrounding businesses.8 7 Second, some evidence suggests that prostitu-
tion contributes to the spread of disease.'
As postconventional values and privacy become more central to moral
reasoning with stage six, s9 however, this evidence might no longer be
enough to justify all applications of laws banning prostitution. While de-
monstrable facts might still support restrictions on public prostitution,
increased emphasis on values such as privacy, relativism, and tolerance may
184. Arnold H. Loewy, Morals Legislation and the Establishment Clause, 55 ALA. L. REv.
159, 173 (2003); cf Kent Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Convic-
tion: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1025-36 (1986)
(discussing justifications for laws protecting animal rights); Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, supra note
20, at 763 n. 13 (discussing animal rights and moral development).
185. See supra note 23.
186. See Eskridge, supra note 57, at 1085 & n.217.
187. See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 184, at 171; David J. Cieslak, End to Prostitution Urged
During Evening Vigil, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 2003, at 6B; Cindy Schroeder, Proposal: Regulate
Sex-Oriented Businesses, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 25, 1999, at lB.
188. See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 184, at 171; Edward V. Morse et al., Behavioral Factors
Affecting HIV Prevention for Adolescent and Young Adult IDUs, J. Ass'N NURSES AIDS CARE,
May/June 1998, at 77, 80, 84. But see Zita Lazzarini et al., Evaluating the Impact of Criminal Laws
on HIV Risk Behavior, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 239, 252 (2002) ("With criminal law as a means of
preventing HIV, we can say that the trial is not over, but the case looks weak.").
189. See supra notes 124, 152.
[Vol. 105:151
Evolving Objective Standards
weigh against laws applied against private acts of prostitution between con-
senting adults.' 90
All in all, it appears that Lawrence and continued reliance on stage five
reasoning will not spell the end to morals legislation. Justice Scalia's dire
prediction was an exaggeration.
CONCLUSION
Ongoing research in psychology suggests that structures of moral devel-
opment are constantly at work, so much so that it is almost impossible to see
the world beyond one's own developmental structure. When judges apply
changing cultural values and ideas like fairness and justice to open-ended
constitutional ideas like equal protection, due process, liberty, and freedom,
they invariably work within developmental structures. It would seem to be
no accident, then, that the Supreme Court's recent morals legislation juris-
prudence can be organized relatively neatly along developmental lines.
Moreover, the developmental piece is sorely missing from the morals
legislation puzzle. While a developmental approach cannot account for
every detail of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on morals legislation, it
contains important truths not included in other approaches. Most impor-
tantly, it lends a measure of predictability and reliability to the use of
evolving standards in constitutional interpretation, an idea widely champi-
oned but poorly understood. Practitioners and judges alike can only benefit
from a solid understanding of moral development in defending their clients
and deciding their cases as law and society continue to evolve in the years to
come.
190. See, e.g., Norma Jean Almodovar, For Their Own Good: The Results of the Prostitution
Laws as Enforced by Cops, Politicians and Judges, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 129, 131-32
(1999).
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